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Abstract
Among a number of formal grammatical accounts especially two of them, the grammati-
cal triple account and the partial algebra account, seem to attract the attention of linguists 
and philosophers of language. The main difference between the two lies in the fact that it 
is only the triple-account where the material form of an expression is directly taken into 
consideration. This turns out to be an all-important factor that opens up an interesting path 
for both theoretical and methodological analysis. The aim of this paper is to argue against 
the algebraic account and to give a stronger and more explicit version of grammatical tri-
ples. The offered approach is more general than the standard one in that it leaves room for 
non-oral forms of speech and allows defining the lack of material form as a grammatically 
informative argument.
Keywords
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Streszczenie
Spośród szeregu formalnych ujęć gramatycznych dwa z nich, tj. koncepcja uporządkowa-
nych trójek gramatycznych oraz koncepcja algebry częściowej zdają się zyskiwać szcze-
gólnie dużo uwagi wśród językoznawców i filozofów języka. Kluczowa różnica pomiędzy 
tymi dwoma ujęciami polega na tym, iż tylko koncepcja trójek gramatycznych bezpośred-
nio uwzględnia materialny kształt wyrażeń językowych. Fakt ten okazuje się szczególnie 
istotny, jako że umożliwia nowe ścieżki w analizie teoretycznej i metodologicznej. Celem 
niniejszego artykułu jest polemika z koncepcją algebry częściowej oraz zaproponowanie 
silniejszej i bardziej doprecyzowanej koncepcji uporządkowanych trójek gramatycznych. 
Zaproponowane tu ujęcie jest ogólniejsze od standardowego z uwagi na fakt, iż uwzględnia 
ono niemówione formy językowe i umożliwia zdefiniowanie materialnego kształtu wyra-
żeń językowych jako gramatycznie relewantnego argumentu.
Słowa kluczowe
uporządkowane trójki gramatyczne, substancja, formy mówione, pismo, mowa wewnętrzna
1 Numerous comments by Richard Dietz, Romuald Huszcza, Wojciech Wiślicki, and two 
anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. In particular, I would like to thank Andrzej 
Bogusławski, whose numerous invaluable comments and corrections have largely shaped my 
view on the problem. I am solely responsible for any errors.
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1. Introduction
There is a current debate in the literature (cf. Pagin and Westerståhl 2010a, 
2010b) over grammatical accounts that allow us to calculate the meaning of 
expressions in a compositional way. The results presented in the present paper 
are meant to serve as arguments in favour of the grammatical triple account, 
as well as arguments against the standard partial algebra account. The paper 
consists of four main parts. In section 2 I discuss some linguistic expressions 
whose physical shape appears to be especially important with regard to the 
linguistic analysis. In sections 3 and 4 I link some logical findings with cer-
tain linguistic data in order to establish logical foundations for my account of 
grammatical triples. In sections 5 and 6 I discuss the problem of abstracting 
over the elements of grammatical triples.
1.1. Terminology
Let us first define certain terms that will be used throughout the text. First of all, 
every linguistic expression may become an object of linguistic interpretation. 
The interpretation process can be defined as a function I that maps particu-
lar material objects onto grammatical triples. Thus, each linguistic expression 
σ  that becomes an output of I can be conceived of as a triple m ,C ,Mσ σ σF . 
m
σF  (material features) stands for a finite and denumerable set of functions 
that are defined for σ . The functions correspond to all and only those material 
features that determine the physical shape of σ , either phonological, written 
(hence graphemic), gestural, or other. To illustrate, in oral speech mσF  cor-
responds to a set of features that determine particular phoneme(s), e.g. being 
bilabial, being voiced, etc. Cσ  stands for a syntactic category of σ , understood 
in terms of categorial grammars. Mσ  corresponds to semantics. It can stand 
for: (i) a truth value {0,1}, if σ  is a sentence; (ii) an object, if σ  is a term; 
(iii) a  mapping from n-tuples of objects to the truth values {0,1}, if σ  is a 
predicate.
Moreover, there exist various linguistic operations defined on expressions 
that generate different expressions. I take recoding (D) to be a cognitive op-
eration that can be defined as a function from triples to triples (the identity 
function is excluded). The value of D is computable on the exclusive basis of 
a finite and denumerable set of grammatical rules and a finite and denumer-
able set of lexical terms. Thus, D can be conceived of as a map from one inter-
preted syntactic tree to another, such that at least one argument of the initial 
triple is replaced by another. The shift must exemplify some grammatical rule, 
so that the value is computable via that rule. The way the argument differs 
from the value determines the operation. To illustrate, if the operation consists 
in translation from one language to another, D is in general expected to be 
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a meaning-preserving (viz. Mσ-preserving) map, but the material form and the 
syntax may change. On the other hand, the process of reading aloud a written 
text is, in general, meant to be a meaning-syntax-preserving map, while the 
material form is being changed.
It is the first argument of the triple ( m
σF ) that is the main object of the pre-
sent analysis. m
σF  is meant to correspond to a set of features that are imposed 
by the material used to formulate the expression. Therefore, I use a catch-all 
term substance to refer only to those metaphysical objects that are actually 
used in the process of formulating linguistic expressions. 
1.2. A plea for triples
The triple account as given above is not altogether new. It may be traced back 
in different forms to a number of authors, e.g. Jacobson (2002: 604−605; 2007: 
193), Kracht (2007: 58−59), Potts (2007: 408), Maier (2010: 3−4). Definitions 
of the first and the second argument are quite standard, so that they do not 
contribute directly to the semantics or to the syntax either. m
σF  is meant to 
cover a somewhat wider area of linguistic expressions, leaving some room for 
non-oral alphabets, e.g. writing, gestures, etc.
Now the problem of why one should prefer the triple account to the par-
tial algebra account, as given in Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b: 388−389) or 
Hodges (2001: 8−9) is not obvious. Here the grammar is defined as a triple 
that consists of a set of expressions, a set of atoms, and a set of functions that 
generate the expressions (grammatical terms) from the atoms. That kind of 
grammar generates strings bound by syntactic functions. Thus letting  be 
a name of some syntactic operation α , and walk, a and dog instantiate three 
atoms, one obtains a grammatical term t:
(t) ( , ( , )   α β= =t walk a dog walk a dog
The partial algebra account is primarily aimed at coping with the syntax-
semantics interface. While it allows to encode subsequent features im-
posed by the actual shape of expressions, it can also do without it. By con-
trast, in terms of the triple account the description given above is simply 
incomplete, for the first argument of the triple remains undefined. Thus, 
t might be a term formulated in oral speech, so that /=ot wɔːk ə dɒg
/, / ,   LS NP walk a dog . It might also be a term formulated in written Eng-
lish, so that   , / ,   =w Lt walk a dog S NP walk a dog . As a matter of fact, one 
might also think of situation where the term remains undefined with respect to 
the first argument, so that , / ,   ∅ = ⊂ ∅m Lt S NP walk a dogF . But a triple 
cannot remain completely undefined with regard to its arguments. 
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It is my claim that the partial algebra account is primarily a generaliza-
tion over material features of expressions. In what follows I shall show that 
(i) that kind of account leads to certain grammatical ambiguities (section 2), 
(ii) it is questionable on logical grounds, especially in light of the operation of 
enquotation (section 4). This, in turn, provides an argument in favour of the 
triple-account.
2. Writing and oral speech – discrepancies between 
kinds of substance
In what follows I shall compare subsequent forms of utterances formulated 
in different substances (oral speech and writing), as well as subsequent forms 
possessing different material features within one substance. The analysis is 
aimed at showing the inadequacy of linguistic analysis in which m
σF  is not 
made explicit enough.
2.1. Affecting pragmatic mechanisms
To begin with, let us have a look at the mechanism in which particular material 
features affect the pragmatics of an expression. Consider the phrases only, not 
only and the problem of intonation. As Bogusławski (2013) points out, there 
is a clear distinction between stressed and unstressed occurrences of only. 
Criticizing Mel’čuk (1974) and Ippolito (2007) for dealing exclusively with the 
unstressed only the author points out that ‘in the vast majority of uses of only 
there is no real possibility of applying (pure) negation to it’. He also states that 
not only (where bolding corresponds to rhematic stress) stands for a regular 
negation of the stressed only. Therefore a difference in intonation appears to be 
meaningful. Consider the following examples:
(1) Peter not only smiled.
(2) Peter not only smiled.
In (1) only is negated in an ordinary way; the speaker simply states that, apart 
from smiling, Peter did also something else. By contrast, in (2) we find a rhe-
matization operation that implies a certain complementation of what is meant 
by the speaker. The intonation proper to (2) simply triggers an implicature. 
Its content can be interpreted as the speaker’s imputing to the person he is 
talking about her not only smiling, but doing something that belongs to a vast 
range of acts that can be judged good or bad. Note, however, that it is only the 
proper choice of what is meant that is determined by the context. The very fact 
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that the semantic value of VP coming after not only gets affected is context-
independent. To illustrate:
(3a) Peter not only smiled. He also gave me a dressing-down!
(3b) Peter not only smiled. He also gave me a kiss and said I was his true love!
As we can see, the special intonation – by definition limited to oral speech 
– provides separate pragmatic mechanisms of conveying certain content. 
In contrary to what happens when one has to do with a written utterance, 
one does not need any context to identify the very existence of that range of 
qualification as soon as one is confronted with the ‘not only + rhematic stress’ 
configuration. But of course it is only a certain direction of how the hearer is 
supposed to handle the relevant range of acts which is in a way identified by 
the context. Put more precisely, let J(x, y) stand for the function 'x is judged to 
be better or worse than y'. Here it is the rhematic stress that imposes further 
constraints on the meaning of the whole sentence. While in the first case it sug-
gests the existence of further actions, in the second it suggests certain features 
of the action in question. Therefore the meaning of the second part of (1) and 
(2) seems to look as follows:
1. 
not only (Peter)(smiled) =
,[ .[ . ( )(  )( (   ( ) ( ) 1))]( )]( )]λ λ< >= ∈ ∈ ∀ ∃ = → ≠ ∧ = = =e tf D x D z g z x g f g z f z Peter smiled
=1, iff Peter not only smiled & , ,only only onlym C MF rhematic stress∧ ∈
only
mF F
2.
,[ .[ .( )(  )( (   ( ) ( ) 1 ( ( ), ( )))]( )]( )]λ λ< >= ∈ ∈ ∀ ∃ = → ≠ ∧ = = ∧ =e tf D x D z g z x g f g z f z J f z g z Peter smiled
=1, iff Peter not only smiled & , ,smiled smiled smiledm C MF rhematic stress∧ ∈
smiled
mF F
Therefore, it is the unstressed not only, together with a stressed VP being the 
argument of not only, that imposes further semantic and pragmatic constraints. 
Consequently, the denotation of ‘not only + rhematic stress’ becomes the sub-
set of not only. And it is the proper intonation that determines the inclusion 
relation.
The examples above exemplify a situation in which a certain pragmatic 
mechanism is triggered by relevant material features of an utterance. How this 
relates to our problem? Note that this works in normal situation only in oral 
speech. There are no written exponents of rhematic stress that are encoded 
into the written sign system of English. While such exponents may be contin-
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gently defined, they are not a part of the common code.2 In other words, the 
graphemic substance does not allow to specify the semantics of the expressions 
discussed above, quite contrary to their phonological equivalents. Therefore if 
one lets D map oral speech onto writing, one obtains a map that returns se-
mantically ambiguous triples; they do not allow to specify linguistic conditions 
under which the semantic value is clear. 
2.2. Pronouns and the problem of indexing
It is far from obvious what actually is the scope of material features. In the dis-
cussion given above I examined examples, where m
σF  triggered certain prag-
matic mechanism. An even stronger account may be found in House (2006: 
1544), according to which intonation may also construct a context, e.g. a con-
text of discourse. Indeed, it seems to be true that intonation can yield such 
exponents that play the role of certain elements of the context. Among others, 
it allows to index some pronouns. These kind of examples are discussed in 
House (2006: 1550) from the pragmatic point of view. However, the discussion 
can be extended to semantics, if one encodes certain material features into the 
expression in question. Let us have a look at the following examples:
(4a)  Mary hugged Lucy and then Jack hugged her.
(4b)  Mary hugged Lucy and then Jack hugged her.
Here the capital font corresponds to the stress accent that additionally indi-
cates foregrounded information, quite apart from particular phonological fea-
tures of all units. Standardly, pronouns are said to be unsaturated expressions 
that need some input from the situational context. In situation like (4a), the 
lack of accent imposes no constraints on the reference of her. Therefore it is 
normally indexed by the most salient element in the linguistic context (), viz. 
the closest (grammatically acceptable) NP. But the indexing procedure appears 
to be different when the pronoun is marked as in (4b). It directs the hearer’s 
attention to the referent different than the one picked out by the unmarked her. 
How about the semantics of the two pronouns? In both cases the reference of 
her can be computed via standard pronoun rule (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998: 
2 An anonymous referee suggested that we could accept a convention that, for instance, 
bolding corresponds to the same function as the rhematic stress. This is of course true. Still, two 
comments are in order. First, there is no such convention encoded into standard written Eng-
lish. Second, one would then deal with different grammar including an additional rule. Moreo-
ver, this does not weaken the argument in favour of the triple account. We would still need to 
explicate the difference between stressed and unstressed argument, although the speech-writing 
discrepancy would disappear.
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111). However, in each case the assignment procedure is based on different 
information (for a similar discussion on pronouns, see e.g. Jacobson 2007):
3.
1 the closest element in 
1 [1 the closest element in ](1) , 
iff , ,
→
= → =
= ∧ ∉
l lc c
l
her her her her
m accent m
her c Lucy
her C M FF F
4.
1 an element different from the closest one in 
1 [1  an element different from the closest one in ](1) , 
iff , , .
l lc c
l
her her her her
m accent m
her c Mary
her C M F
→
= → =
= ∧ ∈F F
Similarly to the previous case, none of the exponents allowing to index the 
variables is represented (in normal situation) in writing. Accent is not marked 
in standard written English, unless it is conventionally defined. Grammatical 
triple being the value of both D and I and corresponding to written expressions 
appears to be semantically ambiguous.
2.3. Ideographic writing system 
As soon as one encounters an ideographic system one touches upon problems 
dramatically different from those pertaining to the oral mode of making ut-
terances. The reason why writing differs so fundamentally from oral speech is 
that graphemic substance imposes its own semiotic features. Graphemic sub-
stance, in contrast to phonetic substance often serves as an intermediary be-
tween the speaker and the recipient who are separated in space and time. The 
recipient frequently exhibits by far more intensive intellectual activity than in 
the case of oral speech where she can verify her tentative interpretation of the 
message, e.g. by asking questions. As Hayashi (2009: 185) points out, reception 
of written utterances knows no limitation on the speed of interpreting or on 
choosing arbitrary parts of the text for examination, as well as on non-linearity 
in the interpretation process. It also allows to re-read the same text more than 
one time3. Thus, both D and I may be conceived of as two-place functions that 
also bind a context. As we will see in the next section, the last two observations 
play a crucial role in understanding the kundoku phenomenon. 
I take ideograms to be writing signs that can remain in semantically non-
vacuous relations with oral speech, alphabetic writing, light-flashed Morse 
code, gestures, etc. This means that the function D mapping from ideograms 
to other signs is, more often than not, defined on grammatically relevant units. 
The nonvacuousness of those relations distinguishes the ideographic writing 
system from other ones. In general, signs of alphabetic writing systems can 
3 This point was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
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represent in isolation only themselves or sounds corresponding to them in 
oral speech. Moreover, their syntactic relations are rather simple, since they 
dependent almost exclusively on the linear order. While some Japanese or Chi-
nese ideograms can be semantically vacuous, these are a drop in the bucket 
compared to the whole graphemic system.
Even more must be said about the semantic value of an ideogram: in spite 
of its being established by convention, more often than not it remains the same 
in all languages using the writing system involved, i.e. in Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, and Vietnamese4. Although the syntactic rules are different in all those 
languages, the order of the signs can be changed while preserving the text-
meaning, provided the proper order of one system is correctly mapped onto 
the order of another one. Thus, the receiver must know the original order, the 
destination order and the rule of transformation. 
And here we touch upon the essence of the kundoku phenomenon. I will 
briefly discuss it, while illustrating the phenomenon with a simple example. 
Consider the following written expression 読書. Consider also its two allo-
graphic forms 讀書 and 读书 which are proper to the classical Chinese or 
Taiwan and the modern Chinese, respectively, but can be used in all the four 
abovementioned languages. This allography carries with it no semantic or syn-
tactic distinctions. Three basic questions have to be answered:
(a)  What is the language concerned?
(b) What is its phonological representation?
(c) What does the sign mean?
Actually, the only question we can instantly answer is (c): the whole expression 
means, depending on context, “to read a text” or “reading a text”. But the other 
two questions cannot be solved by reference to the context. The expressions in 
question can be recoded in each language in which the Chinese ideographic 
writing system has been adopted. In the present paper I shall limit the dis-
cussion that follows to Chinese and Japanese, for the reason given above (see 
footnote 3). Thus, the answer to question (a) is: Chinese or Japanese. Question 
(b) appears to be even more complicated. While in Chinese the whole expres-
sion is read as dúshū, there are several possibilities of recoding it from Chinese 
into Japanese,
(b1)  dokusho ‘reading a text’
(b2)  dokusho su (contemporary dokusho suru) ‘to read a text’
(b3)  sho o doku su (contemporary sho o doku suru) ‘to read a text’
(b4)  sho o yomu or ‘to read a text’.
4 At present almost exclusively in Chinese and Japanese.
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In (b1) the phonological order corresponds to the original Chinese syntax, 
but the phonological representation is Sino-Japanese. In (b2) the phonologi-
cal order remains the same as in the original Chinese syntax; however, there 
is a purely Japanese auxiliary verb su (for classical Japanese), meaning ‘to do’, 
or (for contemporary Japanese) suru which are added to the Sino-Japanese 
verbal nouns. In (b3) the phonological representation remains the same as in 
(b2): the Sino-japanese for the stem and purely Japanese for the auxiliary verb; 
still, we can observe here a different order compared to the original graphemic 
shape corresponding to the Chinese syntax. What is particularly significant is 
the fact that, despite that kind of change, the meaning remains the same as in 
(b2). The expression ‘to read a text’ consists of the predicate ‘to read’ (読) and 
the complement ‘text’ (書). Although the order of these sentence parts can be 
different depending on language, the syntactic role and the meaning are con-
stant. Despite the fact that the standard word order of Chinese has the predi-
cate-complement sequence, the reverse of it is true of Japanese. Consequently, 
one who knows the syntactic role of those parts can change the word order, 
thus correlating it with a different syntax. That kind of oscillation compels us 
to add the particle and the auxiliary verb; but this is indispensable only in the 
case of recoding the text to oral speech or to different graphemic system and 
not in the case of the primary act of interpreting the graphemic text. What is 
more, such a syntactic change does not entail a semantic one.
In (b4) the situation is clearly similar to that of (b3); merely the Sino-Japa-
nese phonological representation doku, together with the auxiliary verb su(ru), 
has been replaced by the purely Japanese verb yomu.
Clearly, Chinese writing systems allows certain linguistic ambiguity pro-
vided the text remains in the graphemic form. The ambiguity disappears when 
a given expression is recoded into oral speech. This interesting feature of Chi-
nese characters gave rise to a unique inter-linguistic communication system 
called kundoku. I shall now pause for briefly describing the phenomenon in 
the next subsection.
2.4. The kundoku phenomenon
In the traditional Japanese linguistic studies the kundoku was classified as an 
activity – as doing something. Such a traditional approach is presented by, 
e.g. Hirayama et al. (1980: 253). Other authors, e.g. Kamei et al. (1996: 321), 
presented an even more convincing label: they defined kundoku as translation. 
Generally speaking, it was equated with recoding Chinese classics in Japanese 
in oral speech. However, in that kind of approach no difference was made be-
tween the system (represented by the rules of such recoding) and pragmatics 
(i.e. the process of implementation of those rules). Here I would like to recall 
important points concerning our issue made by Kamata and Tabe (1994: 3−4), 
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where kundoku is treated as an act of translation. Their approach is clearly 
cognate to mine; still, a reservation is in order – in view of certain ambiguities 
in their presentation. First of all, in my opinion kundoku should be character-
ized as a system of rules, to keep the phenomena apart from acts of transla-
tion whose nature seems to be entirely different. Moreover, it seems to better 
grasp the nature of the phenomenon. It is a procedure of recoding (D) written 
Chinese texts in Japanese. Therefore, it is a set of rules that allow mappings 
from syntactic trees of Chinese to syntactic trees of Japanese. It follows the 
procedure of interpretation (I) that maps a sequence of written signs onto syn-
tactic trees of Chinese. What is especially important here is that neither D nor 
I entail the substance switch, i.e. a mapping from material features that deter-
mine writing onto material features that determine oral speech. That kind of 
mapping goes beyond the kundoku; it may be cognitively important, but none-
theless it materializes a separate operation. In this regard the sub-vocalization 
process, pointed out by an anonymous referee, also falls out of the scope of 
kundoku. This fact was already stated by Hjelmslev (1961: §21) when he said 
that no phonological mediation is necessary in order to understand the written 
text. The whole system rests upon two crucial features: the features of graph-
emic substance and ideography. 
By features of the graphemic substance I mean a class of features where 
the existence of a set of forms of utterance is presupposed. Although a written 
text is generally linear, the graphemic substance enables a receiver to change 
an original collocation in the process of recoding it. Oral speech, because of 
the instability of its phonological substance (what I have in mind is of course 
a situation where no audio-recording device is used), offers that kind of op-
portunity only in theory, unlike writing, which is by definition free from such 
limitations. 
By ideography I mean here the fact that in their vast majority Chinese char-
acters correspond to triples different from , , {' '}σ σ σσ σ= = =m C NP MF , 
so that an ideographic expression may become an input for non-trivial gram-
matical operations. Crucially, it is knowledge about the whole triple that ena-
bles one to make that kind of operation. Such an operation delivers different 
syntactic trees, interpretable on the basis of grammar of the target language. 
Let us have a look at the following example of the Chinese text Book of Rites:
(5a)  The Chinese original text (numbers correspond to the order of interpret-
ing subsequent characters):
侍坐		 於	 長者、履	 	 不	 上	 於	 堂
0１	 ２	 ３４、５	 	 ６	 ７	 8	 ９
serve in lord, with.shoes.on not enter  part. quarters
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‘If one serves at lord’s side, one should not enter the quarters with shoes on.’
(5b) The word order	in Japanese recoding (kundoku)
長	 者	 於	 侍	 坐、履		 堂	 於	 上	 不
３	 ４	 ２	 ０	 １、５		 ９	 ８	 ７	 ６
Three comments are in order at this point. First, the output of D, viz. (5b) is 
only one possible way of recoding the initial expression. One and the same 
Chinese text may be recoded into Japanese in many ways. Thus, letting D be 
a two-place function : ,σ φ→D c , where c stands for standard Kaplanian con-
texts and σ  for the syntactic tree, one obtains a set of possible operations re-
alized in particular contexts 1 2, ,...c c . Each operation, it bears repeating, may 
deliver grammatically different trees. Second, the final output is the value of 
the function ( ( ), )piD I c , where c stands for the initial sequence of written 
characters. Thus it is by definition determined by grammatical rules, so that 
the final output cannot be a bosh. Moreover, as stated above, the whole opera-
tion is (possibly) meaning-preserving. Third, since D may deliver a number of 
different syntactic trees, the operation that maps onto units of oral speech may 
deliver a number of possible variants. Of course, the plurality of possible final 
outputs is caused, in the first place, by graphemic substance that allows a num-
ber of D-mappings. Obviously, this is not allowed by phonological substance.
The example given above illustrates what was stated in the previous subsec-
tion. A text written by means of Chinese characters, provided it is interpreted 
in its written form, allows a number of mappings within the framework of 
more than one grammatical system. The ambiguity is of a systemic character, 
meaning that it is not a contingent feature of a given expression. Surprisingly, 
those two features were made use of to produce even more linguistically com-
plex expressions; these shall be briefly discussed in the following subsection.2.5. Man’yōshū and the graphemic-grammatical ambiguity
The abovementioned example from Book of Rites is by far not an extreme case 
of linguistic ambiguity we can find in texts written in ideographic writing sys-
tems. One of the most illuminating texts in this respect is the first Japanese an-
thology of poetry Man’yōshū (“Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves”) compiled 
in the second half of the 8th century. Even though the poetry is being recoded 
into oral speech in a purely Japanese way, the written text seems to be gram-
matically ambiguous. Let us have a look at Pierson’s translation of two lines of 
poem no. 3202, scroll no. XI: 
(6) 如何毛君之	 Nanika mo kimi ga Why my lord
	 所見不来将有	 Miekozaruramu  Doesn’t seem to appear
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Although the first line is grammatically coherent (the collocation is purely 
Japanese), the second line represents a Sino-Japanese grammatical contamina-
tion. The whole line consists of one compound verb “miekozaruramu”. Mie- 
見え (from miyu) ‘to be seen’ is in the intransitive (unaccusative) verb (not-
withstanding the fact that from the purely graphemic point of view there is 
a Chinese exponent of passive voice, viz. 所; on the other hand, in Japanese the 
passive voice as well as verb’s intransitivity were often used as an appreciative 
marker) corresponding to miru	見る ‘to see’. As one can see, in the graphemic 
form 見 mi- is the stem and its intransitivity is marked by the prepositional 
character. This exemplifies a Chinese collocation, where a separate morpheme 
suŏ, written with the ideogram 所 and put before the verb, was used as an ex-
ponent of passive voice. By contrast, in Japanese such a compound expression 
corresponds to a single verb. Consequently, in the first part of the compound 
verb, we have a verb ‘to be seen’ that is written in the Chinese order, but recod-
ed in oral speech in a different, purely Japanese order. The whole analysis turns 
out to be even more complicated in the case of the second verb kozaruramu 
‘doesn’t seem to appear’ (literary ‘will not come’). The relevant morphological 
analysis proceeds as follows:
(a) ko–  stands for the stem from ku ‘to come’; in writing it corresponds 
to the ideogram 来;
(b) –zaru–  the morpheme of negation in attributive form (from zu) repre-
sented in writing with the ideogram 不;
(c) –ramu the conditional mood morpheme, here used in a rhetorical 
question; represented in writing with the ideograms 将有.
Let us once again have a look at the whole verb kozaruramu	 不来将有. 
As one can see, the Japanese order (a)(b)(c) is represented in writing by 
(b)(a)(c). This is because the order of the stem and the marker of negation is 
different. Although in Japanese, which is an agglutinative language, negation 
is marked by means of an ending (by definition succeeding a verb), in Chinese 
the word-order is the reverse of this and the marker of negation precedes the 
verb. Consequently, in the case of negation we have the Chinese order in writ-
ing, as opposed to the Japanese order in oral speech. But the whole expression 
turns out to be even more complicated since, in addition, we have the ending 
–ramu marking the conditional mood which corresponds to 将有in writing. 
Clearly enough, the presence of an ending (here both in writing and in oral 
speech) represents Japanese, not Chinese, but, on the other hand, the syntax 
of the written ending is Chinese, not Japanese. What we can observe here is 
a kind of reinterpretation of the meaning of the Japanese marker and of coding 
it with Chinese syntax. The literal meaning of the written expression 将有 is 
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a rhetorical question “is it really going to happen”.5 Therefore, what in Chinese 
is expressed by means of the morpheme 将 which precedes the verb, in Japa-
nese is expressed by means of the ending. Thus, we can observe here the fol-
lowing situation: the ending of the verb (which is generated by the grammati-
cal rules of Japanese, but absent from Chinese) is written in Chinese syntax. 
To sum up, let us have a look at the collocation types of miekozaruramu	
所見不来将有. Take R to be a relation such that  reads: ‘the collocation be-
tween  x and y is generated by the grammar of language R'. Let ‘Ch’ stand 
for Chinese and ‘J’ for Japanese. The description of the expression in question 
reads as follows:
(7) 所Ch見∧¬(所J見)
	 不Ch来	∧¬ (不J来)
	 来J(将有) ∧¬ (来Ch(将有))
	 将Ch有	∧¬ (将J有)
As can be seen, it is impossible to give an unequivocal answer to the question 
of which language the abovementioned written expression belongs to, quite 
unlike a similar question concerning its phonological representation.
Let us take stock. The discussion given above shows clearly that certain lin-
guistic phenomena cannot be described properly without taking into account 
a number of constraints imposed by material features of linguistic expressions. 
Certain features imposed by material features may affect not only semantic 
features within a given language. The examples drawn from the Sino-Japanese 
data show that the expression in question may be classified in different lan-
guages, depending on the first argument of the triple. Although the text writ-
ten by means of Chinese ideograms may be conceived of as undefined (or even 
mixed) with respect to language (Chinese, Japanese, etc.), that kind of ambigu-
ity is no longer observable in oral speech. I shall now move to more theoretical 
points and show how the triple account may be defended on logical grounds.
3. We know how we say things. Language  
as an epistemic object
While the fact that the three elements of grammatical triples affect one another 
does not seem to be controversial, the fact that all of them must be bound by 
an epistemic functor tends to be neglected. To cite an illustration from Lev-
inson (2003: 54−55), he compares two, in fact completely different, situations 
5 In Pierson’s interpretation it corresponds to ‘doesn’t seem to’. The ideogram 将 stands for 
the conditional mood marker of a rhetorical question; 有 stands for ‘to be’.
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where one party is not able to interpret an indexical properly. His first example 
concerns the well-known situation when someone posts a notice on the door 
saying: I’m coming back in 5 minutes. The other one is as follows. Someone 
says: Listen, I’m not disagreeing with you, but with you, and not about this, but 
about this. The very moment the light suddenly went out. From the viewpoint 
of knowledge of our utterances as interpreted above, the two situations are 
completely different; they cannot be lumped together. The former example 
is infelicitous because the speaker is ignorant about the results following the 
standard way of using graphemic substance, i.e. the fact that the time of ut-
terance is not contextually salient. The receiver of the written text I’m coming 
back in 5 minutes is not able to identify the time denoted by in 5 minutes. By 
contrast, the latter simply embodies a pure coincidence; its infelicitousness has 
nothing to do with speaker’s linguistic knowledge. However, Levinson leaves 
his examples without any comment concerning the difference between them. 
I shall make the discussion more explicit making use of Bogusławski’s (2007) 
concept of the epistemic functor know that. The functor ( , , , ( ))¬ ¬K s o a a  
binds four arguments standing for: an agent, an object, an attribute and its 
logical complement, to be read: s knows about o that a, not: not a.
This is the crucial point concerning the main problem of this paper. One 
who utters , ,σ σ σσ = m C MF  necessarily knows the way each argument of 
the triple relates to others with respect to the semantics of σ . In other words, 
she knows how the relationship between the arguments affects the semantics 
of her utterance. Otherwise the speaker is not a competent user of σ . Put more 
precisely, let U stand for the three-place function that maps from speakers, 
expressions and contexts (including time, place and world) to utterances, and 
σR  for the catch-all notion for the relation that is non-vacuous with respect 
to the semantics of σ . Then the whole rule governing the competent use of any 
expression reads as follows:
(expr-use)
( , , )(( , , ( , , )) ( , )(( , ) ( ,{ , }, , ( ))))σ σ σ σ σσ σ σ α β α β σ α β α β α β∀ = ∧ → ∀ ∈ → ¬ ¬ms c C M U s c K s R RF
Otherwise the speaker is not competent to use the particular expression. To 
illustrate, in contrast to (1), the speaker of (2) simply knows that the hearer 
will expect further explanation with regard to the additional semantic load 
encoded by means of that kind of intonation contour. Of course, (expr-use) 
excludes, among others, Levinson’s examples.
One could object that in spite of the fact that we do know how we say things, 
this circumstance does not justify taking substance of an utterance into con-
sideration. Substance might have been conceived of as an argument the scope 
of which is determined by the semantics and syntax. My argument against 
such an account comes from the logical properties of the second-order lan-
guage. I shall make this explicit by making use of Reach’s study of quotation.
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4. Reach’s concept of quotation
Let us first put the problem more strictly. While it goes without saying that 
knowledge about any expression entails speaker’s ability to quote the expres-
sion, it is far from obvious whether it necessarily entails the presence of m
σF  
in (expr-use). Theoretically speaking, one could make use of two well-known 
accounts, viz. the partial algebra account of grammar and Tarski’s concept of 
quotation-functions. Then enquotation would be a map from abstract gram-
matical terms (i.e. undefined with respect to material features) to quoting 
expressions, viz. Q(e)='e', where e is the value of functions corresponding to 
grammatical rules defined on atoms. This was, in general, the view given in 
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b). In a similar vein, Cappelen and Lepore (2007) 
argue that expressions taken as classes may be quoted, quite apart from quota-
tion defined on actual tokens. It is my claim, however, that Reach’s findings 
made in the late thirties show that both accounts are untenable.
As Reach (1938) points out, if one wishes to express the relation between 
a word and its denotation, one should first name the word; this is because “we 
cannot speak of what is nameless”. Therefore one has to give some name to 
the word and then state that the word called by a specific name picks out the 
specific denotation. Consequently, it is not the sentence His name is Peter that 
tells us what the word Peter refers to, but the sentence His name is ‘Peter’. This 
is because the name in question is not used but mentioned (this is how it is 
different from, say, Peter is reading a book.; for a more detailed discussion, see 
Geach (1980), Read (1997)). Thus we are not saying the name, but the name of 
this name. By the same token, if one tries to express the relation between the 
quoting expression and the quoted expression, one always refers to the name 
of the expression in question, not to the very expression. 
Reach’s proposal goes as follows. If mentioning the expression does not al-
low a speaker to say the name of expression, the expression in question must 
be shown directly. This, in turn, is not possible as long as one uses only ex-
tensional mappings, for the reasons given above. Thus, the argument must be 
given directly, not via extensional function, in the form of an intensional argu-
ment. In formal notation, Reach expresses it as F[x, y, …](u, v, …). The square 
brackets stand for the intensional argument in material supposition (thus the 
expression “dog”6 displays the particular utterance dog). The round parenthe-
ses enclose the extensional description: ‘the name’, ‘the expression’. Thus, to 
take an example given by Reach, if one refers to semicolon, she does so in the 
following way:
6 I use single quotes to marks expressions of the metalanguage that denote expressions of the 
object language. Consequently, double quotes mark expressions of the metametalanguage that 
denote expressions of the metalanguage. 
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(name relation)  Nm[;](Semicolon)
to be read; has the name Semicolon. And as Bogusławski points out (2007: 51–
52) when commenting on Reach, the absolute necessity of linguistic expres-
sions playing the part of an immediate object of uncontroversial knowledge 
manifests itself precisely in the process of quotation (material supposition).
The crucial point concerning the present discussion is given both by Read 
(1997) and Geach (1980), according to whom Reach’s findings show that quo-
tation cannot be a function from expressions of the first-order language to the 
expressions of the metalanguage. It must, for purely logical reasons, be defined 
on the material shape exemplified by the token actually being used in the quot-
ing utterance. Gaskin and Hill (2013) argued that every metalanguage that 
systematically denotes expressions of the first-order language would be sat-
isfactory. Thus, they provide a solution without making use of an intensional 
argument. However, the authors fail to see that any metalanguage except pure 
quotation, no matter how systematic, needs defining. And when one tries to 
define the relation between some artificial metalanguage and the expressions 
of the first-order language, the initial problem reappears. 
In light of Reach’s comments, the concept of abstract grammatical terms 
generated within the scope of partial algebra, as well as the functional ap-
proach to quotation, is untenable. On the other hand, as soon as one refers to 
an expression in terms of quotation, one necessarily refers to its material side. 
Therefore the aspect of substance utilized in uttering it appears automatically. 
The very nature of quotation, which consists in reference to the shape of an 
utterance, implies the presence of some kind of substance. This shows that 
any act of eliminating the first argument from grammatical triples can be con-
ceived of as a handy simplification, untenable in the case of a general model. 
Consequently, Reach’s findings concerning quotation show that the presence 
of material features follows from logical, not only empirical, observations.
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5. Grammatical triples and empty sets
Does this mean that all linguistic expressions must have a physical form? No, 
it does not. After all, our everyday life is full of meaningful intrinsic contents7 
that we all may even find hard to verbalize. This, however, does not mean that 
grammatical triples that correspond to those contents are undefined with re-
spect to the first argument. And this is the all-important point in the present 
approach.
The problem, however, is not trivial. Since intrinsic contents are meaning-
ful, they must consist at least of the second and the third argument that cor-
respond to (some) syntactic type and the denotation. Let , ,σ σ σσ = m C MF  
be the general form of every linguistic unit. Then for intrinsic contents one 
obtains , ,σ σ σσ = m C MF  and 
σ ⊂ ∅mF . Then the relevant formula would 
have read as follows:
(int. cont) ( )((  is an intrinsic content ( ))σ σσ σ σ∀ → ∈ ∧ ⊂ ∅m mF F .
This seems to be true, but it is quite puzzling from the point of view of linguis-
tic description. If σ ⊂ ∅mF , then why one should take it into consideration in 
a general model? 
What seems to be crucial here is that the empty set corresponding to the 
first argument is relevant with regard to linguistic knowledge expressed in 
(expr-use). An interesting discussion may be traced back to the criticism 
given by Jakobson and Halle (2002) concerning Hjelmslev’s approach to the 
role of substance in his general model. Hjelmslev (1961: §21) claimed that 
two expressions formulated in different substances, say written signs and oral 
speech, may embody the same form. In such view substance becomes a passive 
addition to the systemic structure. Jakobson and Halle (2002: 27) paid close at-
tention to the purely phonological aspect of words and formulated a universal 
conclusion:
If the sound substance were a mere variable, then the search for linguistic invariants 
would indeed have to expunge it. But the possibility of translating the same linguistic 
form from a phonological substance to a graphic substance, e.g. into a phonetic nota-
tion or into an approximately phonemic spelling system does not prove that the phono-
logical substance, like other ‘widely different expression substance’, is a mere variable.
7 For the sake of the present paper I take “intrinsic content” to be equal with its numerous, 
more or less accurate, synonyms, such as “internal speech”, “inner speech”, “soliloquy”, “psycho-
logical objects”, etc.
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As one can see, even in a systemic approach to language, such as the one Jakob-
son and Halle were representatives of, the problem of substance figures high 
on the agenda. 
It is at this point that the functor know that, the crucial importance of which 
was stressed by Bogusławski (2007), allows to formalise the whole phenomena 
without getting involved into epistemic inconsistencies. The point lies not in 
the fact that every linguistic expression, including intrinsic contents, neces-
sarily consists of all three arguments, while m
σF  may appear to be an empty 
set. The point lies in the fact that for all competent users of language the se-
mantic relevance of the relation between all three arguments is the epistemic 
object. The arguments must be bound by the epistemic predicate. And this fact 
is perfectly covered by (expr-use). Every competent user of language simply 
knows about intrinsic contents that the relationship between the empty set 
represented by m
σF  and other arguments is semantically relevant. It is not just 
the case that σ ⊂ ∅mF ; m
σF  is known to be a semantically relevant empty set.
Now if intrinsic contents are said to be structurally equal to all other linguis-
tic expressions, how do they differ from all lexical units? The point, as I see it, lies 
in analysability; intrinsic contents are unanalysable. The reason why I take them 
to be unanalysable comes from quotability. Let me recall what Żytkow (1998) 
had to say on that account. For any analysis to be possible, the object to be ana-
lysed must be isolated from other objects. In order to isolate a unit of intrinsic 
contents, one first has to point to something that is not a part of inner speech 
and that is independent of it. The argument is twofold. First, this will never be 
possible, since the only “cognitive tools” we possess are exactly those intrinsic 
contents. Second, as Żytkow points out (1998: 90), those “intrinsic contents” 
cannot be defined verbally. According to him, the only possible definition is the 
ostensive one. And this is perfectly cognate with the abovementioned concept 
given by Reach. Intrinsic contents fall out of the scope of any analysis because 
they are not quotable. And they are not quotable because they escape the scope 
of Reach’s intensional argument, flanked by square brackets.
To close this section, it is worth pointing out that I do not maintain that 
substance plays the role of a functor that generates a full linguistic expression 
from an ordered pair of the form ,σ σC M . The crux of the matter lies in the 
fact that such units are purely theoretically construable concepts. All actual 
units of language (including the language of thought) must be known by the 
speakers to be defined with respect to all three arguments, including m
σF . This 
also concerns empty sets. Empty sets, e.g. σ ⊂ ∅mF  or σ ⊂ ∅M , simply cor-
respond to possible scenarios that are relevant for communication. In the case 
of the former the expression in known to be intrinsic; in the case of the latter 
it is known to lack the denotation. Note, however, that this fact is neither cov-
ered by the standard partial algebra account, nor is it given explicitly within all 
above-mentioned accounts that make use of grammatical triples.
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6. Internal irreducibility of grammatical triples
The all-important idea of the concept presented here is that grammatical tri-
ples of the form , ,σ σ σσ = m C MF  cannot be reduced to any ordered pair. In 
other words, there exist no linguistic expressions that can become epistemic 
objects while being undefined with respect to the linguistic features of all three 
elements of grammatical triples. Put more precisely, if , ,σ σ σσ = m C MF  then 
the following is true: 
(ling. expr.) (   (  is a linguistic expression ( )(á)( )( á ó ( , , , ( ))))α∀ ↔ ∃ ∀ ∃ ∈ → ¬ ¬s a K s a a
The argument α may stand for the feature ‘is an empty set’, but the very α is not 
an empty set; it must convey some relevant information.
Does this mean that there is no room for a description of linguistic expres-
sions of the form ,σ σC M ? No, it does not. Actually, a number of grammars 
exclusively deal with that kind of expressions. However, two comments are 
in order at this point. First, such units are obtained via generalization over 
full-fledged triples. Otherwise, none of these expressions could be even judged 
quotable or not. It would simply remain undefined whether such units are ut-
terable in a particular form or not. Second, that kind of generalization chang-
es the status of the linguistic expression in question. The difference I have in 
mind corresponds to that of Wittgenstein’s (1921) distinction between facts 
and complexes. In short, the complex is the set of all possible configurations; 
the fact, on the other hand, is the only configuration of this set that actually 
exists. Thus a complex is neither an actual nor a potential case. It is a set of 
possible cases, one of which becomes a fact. And since complexes lack their 
truth-value, they cannot be, as pointed out by Potter (2009: 104), a proposi-
tional thought.
A corresponding distinction can be drawn for grammatical triples. As 
I have been at pains to show, generalizing over material features may result in 
expressions that are undefined with respect to their linguistic features. Such 
units cannot, of course, be actually used in an utterance, not only because they 
are not quotable, but also because they remain undefined with respect to their 
relevant features. And linguistic units that cannot be used in an utterance (even 
as a thought) cease to be actual or potential linguistic units at all. It is in this re-
gard that I take the expressions of the form ,σ σC M  to correspond to Witt-
genstein’s complexes. In terms of the notions introduced at the beginning of 
this paper we can say that expressions of the form ,σ σσ = C M  correspond 
to a set of values obtained from a given token via the interpretation function I. 
Tellingly, they do not correspond to any actual act of linguistic interpretation.
α) (α σ(   σ)(σ(   (  is a linguistic expression (á)( )( á ó ( , , , ( ))))α∀ ↔ ∃ ∃ ∈ → ¬ ¬s a K s a a
108 Jan Wiślicki
7. Summary
The main aim of this paper was to argue for a stronger triple-account of gram-
mar, as well as against the standard partial algebra account. Setting off from 
particular examples of the expressions of natural language I showed that gen-
eralizing over material features changes the logical status of the object to be 
analysed. This is the gist of the foregoing discussion. The standard partial al-
gebra account as defended, e.g., in Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b) does not, 
for logical reasons, deal with the actual linguistic expressions, but merely with 
complexes. Moreover, the standard triple-account turns out not to be explicit 
enough. In this regard I defined and formalised additional rules that allow to 
determine the actual status of all the three elements of grammatical triples 
with respect to any linguistic analysis. The elements have been described from 
the epistemic point of view, in which it is the epistemic functor know that, 
understood along the lines of Bogusławski (2007), that binds all the elements 
of grammatical triples. This, in turn, was introduced by means of semantic 
relation that holds between the elements. This move imposed all-important 
constraints on the elements of the triple that are not given in other triple ac-
counts. The constraints opened up a new path for describing the expressions 
generated within the standard partial algebra model. The expressions turned 
out to be incomplete and thus undefined. What is more, it is the triple account, 
and not the standard partial algebra account, that allows to express that kind of 
undefinedness. Within the scope of the latter, subsequent semantic and formal 
ambiguities presented in section (2) remain unsolved. Therefore the stronger 
triple account, as given here, allows not only to determine well-formed linguis-
tic expressions, but also to express their conditions and the source of potential 
incompleteness.
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